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GAMING DELAWARE
WILLIAM

W. BRATTON*

I. TRANSACTIONAL GAMING UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENT
LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE

Back in 2000, at the World Trade Center in Portland, Oregon,
Time Belden and other Enron electricity traders carefully studied the
regulations governing California's new electricity market. Belden
thought that the complex rules were "prone to gaming."' And game
them he did. Under one strategy, Enron filed imaginary transmission
schedules, creating nonexistent congestion, so as to draw on the rules'
provision of payment to alleviate congestion.2 They called it "Death
Star.",3 Then there was "Ricochet," or megawatt laundering, under
which Enron circumvented price caps by exporting power out of California, only to bring the power back later, when the State, desperate
for supply, had to pay a premium price. 4 Eventually, with an energystarved California up in arms and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission investigating energy sales to the State, Enron's lawyers
paid the traders a visit. The traders walked the lawyers through the
transactions, demonstrating legality under what must have been
highly technical applications of the rules. The lawyers, expecting litigation, said, "Alright, but is it too late to change the names? Can't
you just call the strategies "Puppy Dog" and "Mama's Cooking"? 5
Enron's North American trading desk made a profit of $2.2 billion in 2000, much of it due to activities in Western region electricity
and natural gas. 6 The crisis in California implied political scrutiny of
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 266 (2003).

2. Id. at 269-70.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 270.
5. Id. at 274.

6. Id. at 282.
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Enron's results, and the firm did not want the public to see the extent

of its profits. So, still gaming the system, it booked $1 billion of pot
as a reserve against potential liability, without actually showing the
reserve in its published financials. 7
In a legal regime of form without substance, an opportunistic actor can exploit the system in much the same way as Enron's traders
and accountants. In such a world, all law is rules-based and literally
interpreted, and there are no backstop interpretive controls in the form
of principles 8 (to use the accountants' term) or standards (to use the
lawyers' term). 9

There is a family resemblance between these tales from Enron
and the terms and operation of Delaware's bedrock doctrine of independent legal significance (ILS). ILS also elevates form over substance and invites gaming. In its classic form, where ILS operates as
a rule of statutory interpretation,' 0 it is almost unique in its disavowal
of substance. With ILS, the state court effectively announces that no
body of substantive principles informs certain applications of the legislature's corporate code, inviting transaction planners to exploit the
literal word at will. As with Enron and power provision to California,
the gainers are those in a position to invest in expertise. As at Enron,

7. Id.
8. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. No. 107-204 § 108(d), 116 Stat. 745 (calling
on the Securities Exchange Commission to conduct a study of "principles-based" accounting
in response to dissatisfaction with gaming of rules-based treatments in recent years).
9. For the classic description of the interplay of rules and standards in American jurisprudence, see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685 (1976).
10. Hariton v. Arco Elec. Inc., 182 A.2d 22 (Del. 1962), aff'd, 188 A.2d 123 (Del.
1963), is the classic case. There Delaware rejected the doctrine of de facto merger. Under the
doctrine, a sale of assets followed by a liquidation that leaves the shareholders of the selling
firm in the same place that a conventional merger would have left them, is treated as a merger
de facto, with the result that the shareholders of the selling firm receive statutory appraisal
rights as if the transaction had been structured as a merger. The operative notion is that technical provisions in the State's corporate code are undergirded by substantive policies, so that
similarity of transactional result means that rights provided in one section of the code apply by
implication under other sections. Such a substantive approach reduces room for transactional
gaming. But see Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25 (Pa. 1958); Rath v. Rath Packing
Co., 136 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1965). In Hariton, Delaware rejected the doctrine, drawing on
ILS, and quoting Judge Leahy in Langfelder v. Universal Lab. D.C., 68 F. Supp. 209, 211 (D.
Del. 1940): "The rationale is that a merger is an act of independent legal significance, and
when it meets the requirements of fairness and all other statutory requirements, the merger is
valid and not subordinate or dependent upon any other section of the Delaware Corporation
Law." 182 A.2d at 26-27. In this affirmative statement, the rule can be described as one of
"equal dignity" for the various sections of the Code. The effect is to open the door for transactional gaming.
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the gamer wins; and if it does not necessarily take all, it does take
quite a bit at the expense of actors disadvantaged by the game. The
victims of ILS usually are minority shareholders, whether dissenters
in a control transaction or a class of preferred holders whose preferences have been stripped. They bear a familial resemblance to California's hapless energy consumers. Both groups sacrifice wealth to
empowered parties wielding the literal word of the law to their own
advantage. They are distant cousins, admittedly, but cousins.
This author supplements Professor Smith's able discussion of
ILS' 1 with some additional thoughts on the question of why Delaware
has made this extraordinary commitment to a form-over-substance jurisprudence. Upon reflection, ILS turns out to be less bad than it
looks, at least in its statutory version. Three significant (and substantive) differences distinguish Delaware law gamers from the gamers at
Enron.
First, when a firm relies on ILS to plan a transaction that exploits
provisions of the corporate code, it games with the sanction of case
law. And, in classic, statutory ILS cases, the courts' literal interpretation of the statute has the benefit of being correct: When Delaware's
legislature enacted the corporate code's sections on charter amendments, mergers, and asset sales, 12 it intended whatever transaction
13
structures the courts and the corporate bar later deemed appropriate.
Enron's gamers played form over substance on riskier regulatory turf:
They would "take the position" that form trumps substance without
advance regulatory endorsement of their legal theories. As they did
so, they incurred significant enforcement risks. 14 Their counsel and
auditor might have curbed the abuses, but neither proved willing to
take responsibility for the exercise of judgment implied when sub-

11. See D. Gordon Smith, Independent Legal Significance, Good Faith, and the Interpretation of Venture Capital Contracts, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 825, 827 (2004).
12. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242, 251, 271 (2001).
13. The statement in the text extrapolates from the documented relationship between the
Delaware legislature and the State's corporate bar. The keeper of Delaware's code in reality is
not the legislature, which acts as a rubber stamp, but the bar's corporate law section. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for.Corporate Charters:History and Agency, 15 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 885, 888-92 (1990).
14. The most famous case of this did not concern electricity trading but sham swaps
entered into between Enron and special-purpose entities formed by the LJMI and LJM2 limited partnerships controlled by its CFO, Andrew Fastow. These transaction structures went
through an exhaustive planning process with the participation of Enron's outside counsel and
auditor. See William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L.
REV. 1275, 1305-20 (2002).
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15
stance intervenes over form.

Second, Delaware's regime of form over substance is not absolute. Delaware law holds out a possibility of ex post substantive scrutiny for some of the transactions that game its code under ILS.
Breaches of fiduciary duty remain a possibility even where ILS formalizes the statutory framework and prevents statutory policies from
constraining gaming. A minority shareholder fobbed out of appraisal
rights in a case like Hariton v. Arco Electronics16 still may be able to

package a process complaint
in the framework of majority-to17
minority fiduciary duty.

Third, statutory ILS and Delaware transactional gaming should
be distinguished from the more extreme versions at Enron because,
historically, statutory ILS has held a central place in Delaware's competitive position in the charter market. Federal United Corp. v. Havender,' in which ILS made its first appearance, was more than just a
preferred stock case in which the Delaware Supreme Court used ILS
to open a loophole for rights stripping. 19 The case also signaled that
Delaware would not subscribe to the antimanagerial approach outlined in Berle and Means' The Modern Corporation and Private

Property.20 Berle and Means' book was still a recent publication in
1940, having first appeared in 1932. But it already was famous, having had a visible impact on Congress in the enactment of the federal
securities laws. 21 Berle and Means, in addition to advocating a mandatory disclosure regime, advocated a state law program in which
management power would be curbed by a substance-over-form doc-

15. In recent years, we have seen widespread compliance problems stemming from
gaming, and the consequent demand for bright line rules coming from legal and accounting
professionals. The trend stems in part from the fact that the professionals are unwilling to say
"no" to their clients absent the support of the clear rule. Without the rule, saying "no"
requires
a judgment call that jeopardizes the client relationship. See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023,
1049-51 (2003).
16. 182 A.2d 22 (Del. 1962), affd, 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963).
17. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (requiring a negotiating
committee on behalf of minority shareholders in a cashout merger).
18. 11 A.2d 331, 337 (Del. 1940).
19. This loophole simultaneously extricated Delaware law from the then-current vested
rights doctrine, to which it had subscribed a few years earlier in Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 A.
115 (Del. 1936).
20. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND

PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1991).
21. Id. at 264-85 (showing the importance of full disclosure for the functioning of the

stock market).
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trine of fiduciary protection of minority shareholders. 22 Havender, in
effect, said that Berle and Means' antimanagement program would
not influence the policy of the state of Delaware. Berle and Means
had singled out the courts, including those of Delaware, as a redoubt
of equitable intervention that protected against laxity in the drafting of
corporate codes and charters and subsequent transactional gaming.
Havender, in containing judicial discretion to police transactions for
unfairness, falsified that description.23
Delaware's move to form over substance paid dividends in the
post-war charter market. Roberta Romano's study of firms reincorporating to Delaware during the period 1960-1982 shows that firms
moved to Delaware in search of a cost-reductive, stable legal regime,
and were about to either go public, promulgate antitakeover measures,
or position themselves as actors in the mergers and acquisitions market. 24 The stability on offer did not come from a state-of-the-art statute-Delaware always has preferred to stick with its old form of code,
changing it incrementally as the need arises. Nor, in those days, before the blockbuster merger and acquisition cases of the 1980s, 25 did
Delaware offer a thick case law on mergers and takeovers. What the
firms preferred was Delaware's formalism. Under Delaware's early
case law, a reincorporating firm concerned about takeover defense
found a nearly bulletproof zone of discretion: Defensive tactics could
be sustained on a formal showing of a threat to company policy with
no further judicial review.26 Firms planning activities as acquirers, in
turn, preferred ILS and Delaware's emphatic rejection of the de facto
merger doctrine: ILS assured them that the courts would not disturb
cost-effective reverse triangular acquisition structures.2 7 Of course,
fiduciary law regarding mergers and takeovers changed rapidly in the
late 1970s and 1980s, limiting management's zone of discretion.
Takeover defenses came under Unocal review; 2 8 cases like Singer29
22. Id. at 196-203.
23. William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century's Turn, 26 J.
CORP. L. 737, 766-67 (2001).
24. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 32-35 (1993).
25. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (instituting duty-of-care
scrutiny of boardroom merger decisions); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985) (instituting proportionality scrutiny of tender offer defense).
26. See Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
27. It should be noted that by the time a reverse triangle was attacked in a de facto
merger jurisdiction, the de facto doctrine had run out of steam and the transaction was sustained. See Terry v. Penn Cent. Corp., 668 F.2d 188, 192-94 (3d Cir. 1981).
28. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 946.
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and Weinberger" brought protection for minority shareholders in
cash-out mergers. But as everyone realized at the time, Delaware
made the concessions only to deflect congressional attention from its
management protection operation.31
Summing up, to the extent the charter competition system is desirable as a matter of economic welfare, statutory ILS is a defensible
formalism.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF INDEPENDENT LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE AND
PREFERRED STOCK

Professor Smith's paper focuses on the contractual variant of
less defensible practice of invoking ILS in the interpretation of class-voting provisions in charters. Here the Delaware courts
still perform for the benefit of the charter market. Traditionally, preferred stockholders do not wield control and therefore do not make
jurisdictional choices for the firms issuing their stock. Decisions favoring preferred stock issuers in allocative contests with preferred
stock holders accordingly perform a customer service function. The
problem for this line of ILS jurisprudence lies in these cases' different
interpretive postures. The document being interpreted is not a section
of the State's corporate code, but the sections of the corporate charter
creating and governing the preferred. The intent of the drafter of a
charter can be expected to reflect very different concerns than that of
the legislature enacting provisions of the corporate code.
Professor Smith makes an interesting excursion into history
when he highlights the contractual variant's origins in the Langfelder
case of 1946. 33 But the leading case in the contractual line came later.
This was Chancellor William T. Allen's 1989 opinion in Warner
3 4 which,
Communications v. Chris-Craft,
like Benchmark Capital
ILS 32-the

29. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977) (imposing strict fiduciary standards on parent firms in cashout mergers).
30. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (overruling Singer and relaxing
inspection to process scrutiny).
31. In the mid-1970s, there was a cognizable threat that much conduct covered by state
fiduciary law would be found fraudulent or manipulative under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), defused that threat.
Later threats came from the Congress, in which preemptive legislation was introduced. See S.
2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
32. Smith, supra note 11, at 831-40.
33. Langfelder v. Universal Lab., Inc., 68 F. Supp. 209 (D. Del. 1946), affd, 163 F.2d
804 (3d Cir. 1947).
34. Warner Communications Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus., 583 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch. 1989).
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PartnersIV, L.P. v. Vague,35 involved a class of preferred that had its

rights stripped in a merger. Both cases interpret a charter's classvoting provision. Interestingly, the preferred in Warner had the
stronger case of the two. There the charter had two class-vote provi-

sions. The first granted the class vote in respect of impairing charter
amendments. 36 The second more generally granted a class vote in re37
spect of changes in rights that adversely affected the preferred.

Chancellor Allen read the second clause to cover only the same territory as the first,38 which effectively rubbed it out of the charter. The
justification was that language in the second clause tracked the lan39
guage of the Delaware code's charter amendment section.

The

tracking, in the court's interpretation, signaled that only charter
amendments were covered, even though the second clause did not
mention charter amendments. The court held the charter's drafter to

the "general understanding" that ILS applied in Delaware interpretation.4° Superficially, this makes sense. But on consideration, it must
be the exact opposite of what that drafter was trying to accomplish.4 '
The manifest purpose of the second, more general provision was to
reverse the ILS read of the statute, under which a court will not imply
a class vote under the merger section of the statute based on the pro-

vision of a class vote under the statute's charter amendment section.
Only by reversing that result could the drafter create viable voting
protection for the preferred, given the constant possibility of rights
stripping by merger with a wholly-owned subsidiary, as in Benchmark.4 2

35. No. Civ. A. 19719, 2002 WL 1732423 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2002).
36. Warner, 583 A.2d at 965 (section 3.4 of the charter).
37. Id. at 965 (section 3.3 of the charter).
38. Id. at 968.
39. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2001) (providing a class vote for a charter
amendment that would "alter or change the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares
of such class so as to affect them adversely").
40. 583 A.2d at 970. See also Sullivan Money Mgmt., Inc. v. FLS Holdings, CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. 97,292 (Del. Ch. 1992).
41. Later, in Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843 (Del. 1998), a more
explicitly drafted clause finally was held to mean what it said, but only after a trip to the Delaware Supreme Court to get a contrary Chancery opinion reversed.
42. But why did the Warner drafter track the charter amendment section of the code?
To see why this technique was used, reference can be made to statutes of other jurisdictions
under which a class vote would have been required in the Warner merger. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS.
CORP. §§ 804(a)(2), 903(a)(2) (McKinney 2003). The drafting technique employed in these
statutes is noteworthy-the drafter makes a reference back to the provision requiring a class
vote for a charter amendment. That is, the merger statute singles out for a class vote merger
plans containing provisions that, if included in a certificate amendment, would trigger the
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III. GOOD FAITH, PREFERRED STOCK CONTRACTS, AND VENTURE
CAPITAL

Professor Smith rightly brings contract law's good-faith doctrine
to bear against these ILS-based interpretations of class vote provisions. Unfortunately, the cards are stacked against the good-faith
case. To see why, let us chart out the analytical route to the issue thus
posed. The exercise shows that Delaware in effect already has rejected any recourse to good faith.
Consider a hypothetical case of rights stripping by merger, as in
Benchmark, and assume further that the charter does not provide the
preferred with a class vote. A Delaware court could still invoke the
good-faith doctrine and conduct an ex post substantive review of the
transaction crammed down by the majority on the minority. But is
the contractual good-faith duty sufficiently robust to support such an
intervention? There is a special formulation of good faith applied to
financial contracts governing senior securities, under which good
faith comes to bear only when the securities issuer traverses rights
explicitly created in the contract.4 3 In cases concerning bonds, this
almost always cuts off good-faith review. 44 Interestingly, a similar
statutory class voting requirement for certificate amendments. This statutory drafting device
requires a court to compare the effects of the merger with the specified transactions provided
for in the amendment provision in order to determine whether a class vote is required in the
merger.
In any event, it is plausible to interpret the phrase "alter or change any rights... so as to
affect the holders of all such shares adversely" in the Warner certificate to include mergers.
Cf Shidler v. All Am. Life & Fin. Corp., 298 N.W.2d 318 (Iowa 1980) (applying a statute requiring a class vote of common stockholders in respect of an amendment that would cancel
shares to apply to a cashout merger). Thus, contrary to the court's analysis, the fact that the
second provision in the Warner charter tracked the language of § 242 of the Delaware code
arguably supported a class vote in a merger; the language in effect referred back to the basic
section that defines situations appropriate for a class vote.
The ruling of the then-leading case interpreting language similar to that contained in the
Warner charter also should be noted. In Levin v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 386 U.S. 162

(1967), which concerned possible preemption of state corporate law on share voting by the
Interstate Commerce Act, the Supreme Court held that a charter provision requiring a class
vote in respect of an alteration or change in "the preferences, qualifications, limitations, restrictions and special or relative rights" of the preferred applied in the case of a consolidation
with another railroad pursuant to which the preferred received common stock. Given this ruling, it is plausible to assume that the drafters of the subsequent generation of preferred stock
contracts would have seen no reason to include more specific language respecting merger
votes.
43. See William W. Bratton, Venture Capital on the Downside: PreferredStock and
CorporateControl, 100 MICH. L. REv. 891, 933-34 (2002).
44. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 957 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981), is the leading case.
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cutoff should not occur in a preferred rights-stripping case. The
stripped preferences are rights explicitly set out in the contract, and
the merger does traverse them. So the good-faith case ought to go
forward, even under the narrow formulation applied to senior securities. There is Delaware precedent that nominally holds open a door
for just this case. Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc. 45 lays down a
distinction in treatment between preferred preferences and rights
shared among the preferred and the common. The preferences are
covered by contract law, while fiduciary protection is conceded only
for rights shared with the common. The split treatment invites application of the good-faith duty in rights-stripping cases. One merely
makes a doctrinal deduction under which the rule of contract law for
preferences imports the good-faith duty. Quadrangle v. Kenetech,46 a
1999 Chancery decision, takes a small step in this direction, entertaining the suggestion that a series of actions taken by a distressed preferred issuer might have been taken with an intent to frustrate the preferred holders' right to a liquidation preference in violation of the
good-faith duty. 47 But the facts of the case did not bear out the sug-

gestion of bad faith, and the court denied the claim.48
In any event, Kenetech is the outlier among the Delaware cases.
Delaware's contract-fiduciary distinction more usually has the effect
of closing the door to ex post scrutiny of the crammed down transaction. The refusal of fiduciary protection for the preferences implies
an across-the-board refusal of ex post fairness review. In Delaware,
"contract" tends to mean literal interpretation when the contract is the
preferred stock contract. The upshot is that class vote emerges as the
exclusive means of protection against rights stripping. Thus, Professor Smith finds himself in the fallback position of invoking good faith
in a last-ditch attempt to get the class vote.
Should Professor Smith's association of good faith and the class
vote find a receptive Delaware judiciary, a further question arises:
How does Delaware articulate the good-faith rubric? Professor Smith
correctly flags Katz v. Oak Industries49 as the leading Delaware case

45. 509 A.2d 584 (Del. 1986). Jedwab expands on Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp.,
401 A.2d 932, 942 (Del. 1979) (declining to impose fiduciary scrutiny).
46. Quadrangle Offshore (Cayman) LLC v. Kenetech Corp., No. 16362 NC, 1999 WL
893575 (Del. Ch. Oct 13, 1999), affd, 751 A.2d 878 (Del. 2000).
47. Id. at'12-13.
48. Id.
49. Katz v. Oak Indus., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. 1986).
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on point. 50 But he leaves open the question as to the appropriateness
of its formulation. However, in my view the question is not open:
The formulation is inappropriate. In Katz, Chancellor Allen, applying
New York law, said that good faith implies a counterfactual finding
that the parties would have drafted for the right asserted by the plaintiff had they thought about it. 51 Law review articles may support that
conclusion, but New York law does not. The good-faith constraint is
triggered when a party exercises a right under the contract in such a
way as to deprive the counterparty of core expectations.
This ex
post intervention presupposes a negative ex ante finding of intent.
The court (perhaps implicitly) finds either that the parties did not intend the right to be exercised so as to impair those core expectations,
or that the parties never thought about the matter. The law, however,
does not go beyond the negative to require an affirmative ex ante
showing of a term in some hypothetical bargain.
Kenetech holds out an alternative, subjective approach, keyed to
the culpability of the officers of the preferred stock issuer who effect
the action that injures the preferred.53 But this reading of good faith
falls short when the preferred needs a class vote to prevent the formal
stripping of its rights. Here there is no question that the issuer "intends" to strip the rights. But that intent is irrelevant if the corporation's process machinery allows the action to be taken without the
preferred being given a separate vote on the matter. The preferred
class vote, in turn, presents a question of interpretation. At this stage,
good faith can assist the preferred only if the court is willing to apply
the doctrine in its broad form and inquire into the parties' core expectations.
These narrow readings of the good faith duty are defensible as a
policy proposition if withholding judicial intervention makes the parties better off in the long run by forcing them to solve their problems
through careful, self-protective drafting. Professor Smith offers a
complete answer to this argument.54 A contract forcing default rule
sounds good in theory, but, in practice, parties in preferred stock deals
just do not get it. The end-run merger with a wholly-owned subsidiary
has been there in the form file for almost seventy years, and still law50. Smith, supra note 11, at 847.
51. 508 A.2d at 880.
52. See, e.g., Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y.

1933).
53. 1999 WL 893575 at *12-13.
54. Smith, supra note 11, at 848.
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yers do not plug the loophole. So if the justification for literalism is
to force parties into more careful drafting, the approach does not seem
to work. Indeed, if contracting parties need a jolt, perhaps the courts
should reverse the presumption and intervene aggressively on the side
of preferred and other minority shareholders.
Such are my doctrinal glosses on Professor Smith's case for
good faith. These apart, he has my complete support in protesting the
negation of good faith and arguing on institutional grounds that
Delaware should invigorate the doctrine. Twenty years ago, I made a
similar argument in a paper on convertible bonds 55 that took on Broad
v. Rockwell International,56 the case that invented the special, delimited variant of good faith. Unfortunately, nobody paid the slightest
attention to my intervention, and subsequent cases followed Broad.57
So I reasserted the good-faith claim in a paper published during the
R.JR Nabisco58 era. 59 But when the bond market thereafter signaled
that it was just as happy to proceed without protection, in exchange
for a couple of extra basis points in yield, 60 I gave up the quest for robust good-faith review of financial contracts for many years.
I renewed the quest a decade later in a discussion of venture
capital preferred. 6 ' It seemed to me that distinctive aspects of venture
capital transactions permitted a distinction to be drawn. Formalism
and literalism are defended more easily when the case concerns publicly traded bonds and traditional listed preferred. Venture capital
deals, being anterior to public trading, look more like traditional relational contracts. Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs often find
themselves in subtle, contingent control relationships. 62 Given con55. William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudenceof Convertible Bonds,
1984 Wis. L. REv. 667, 714-16.
56. 642 F.2d 929, 957 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981).
57. See, e.g., Gardner & Florence Call Cowles Found. v. Empire, Inc., 589 F. Supp.
669, vacated on other grounds, 754 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1985).
58. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(refusing to imply a good-faith duty protecting bondholders in a leveraged restructuring).
59. William W. Bratton, Jr., CorporateDebt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of
Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 119-21.
60. Protective contract terms that reversed the RJR Nabisco result, called "poison puts,"
appeared in new deals in the late 1980s. But they soon disappeared. The bond market decided
that it was quite willing to take the risk of leveraged restructuring in exchange for a couple of
basis points. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Anti-Takeover Provisions in Bonds:
Bondholder Protection or Management Retrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REv. 931 (1993). In my
view, the market thereby implicitly accepted the enervation of the good-faith duty.
61. Bratton, supra note 43.
62. Id. at 916-22.
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tractual incompleteness, the properties of these relationships fall into
the core territory in which contract law sanctions ex post judicial umpiring.
The case for a fresh start in the interpretation of venture capital
preferred should resonate even in the special context of Delaware.
With venture capital, the preferred stockholder participates equally in
the choice of state of incorporation, perhaps even being the determining party in many cases. So long as the cases carefully cordon off
venture capital relationships, ex post intervention need not give rise to
disruptive implications for Delaware's principal customer base-the
managers of publicly traded companies. Once freed of concerns
about the customer base, Delaware judges are extremely good at
evenhanded interpretation of financial contracts. Vice Chancellor
Leo Strine's treatment of issues arising under a standard merger
agreement in IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,63 provides a good example. If the Delaware courts took a similar approach to disputes between venture capitalists and the entrepreneurs, a cogent, first-class
body of case law would result.
Benchmark, of course, shows that Delaware courts still follow
the traditional template. But, as Professor Smith shows, the fit is
awkward, so we still might see the Delaware courts take a new look at
venture capital contracts. Some kind of signal of dissatisfaction from
the industry may be needed to focus their attention, however. Meanwhile, I am happy to leave the quest for good faith in financial contracting in Professor Smith's capable hands, albeit with a warning that
he not get his hopes up.
Even as I concur with the project's wider objectives, I should
admit to some doubts about the particulars of the case for intervention
presented in Benchmark. First, I would at least entertain the suggestion that venture capital firms contemplate that a minority investor
takes the risk of recapitalization by merger with a wholly-owned subsidiary. Venture capital charters tend to contain a one-size-fits-all
merger provision. Such a provision treats a merger as a liquidation
that triggers a right to redeem the preferred if the stockholders immediately prior to the merger own less than fifty percent of the voting
power ex post the merger.64 The clause picks up acquisitions by third
63. In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 789 A.2d 14 (Del. 2001) (balancing the interests of the parties in the transactional context in interpreting a material adverse change
clause in a merger agreement).
64. Bratton, supra note 43, at 941. Significantly, the term overrules the result of Rothschild Int'7 Corp. v. Liggett Group, 474 A.2d 133 (Del. 1984).
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parties but excludes the wholly-owned subsidiary recapitalizations.65
One can argue that the result is unintended, and that bounded rationality prevents the parties from appreciating the rights-stripping danger
held out by a merger with a shell subsidiary. But the counterargument also is open: Recapitalizations that facilitate new financing
benefit the enterprise and can be structured equitably; an antecedent
minority venture capital interest could use a contractual veto in a recapitalization to hold up the other interest holders in the firm; therefore, the minority venture capitalist who does not negotiate for the
veto expressly takes the risk of an unfavorable cram-down recapitalization.
Second, I find myself asking whether Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. reasonably could be left to fend for itself, at least on the
facts of this case. My doubts arise when I look past the doctrinal barriers to good-faith scrutiny and entertain the merits of Benchmark's
hypothetical good-faith case. Benchmark poses a telling contrast with
the other leading Delaware case on venture capital relationships, Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. v. Adams. 66 Both cases concern venture
capital investors with minority stakes at the shareholder level and no
control at board meetings. Both lie on downside fact patterns, with
the investee firm facing insolvency unless new financing is procured.
In both, the minority venture capitalist objects to the new financing.
However, the two cases part company at this point. In Adams, a redemption trigger was manipulated to facilitate a last-minute, peanutsized, secured-debt deal, with the stakes being a stub of salable assets,
the enterprise otherwise not having proved viable.67 The secured loan
froze the venture capitalist's stake under water, where a present liquidation in the wake of the triggering of the preferred's redemption
rights would have yielded the venture capitalist the stub of salable assets. A strong inference of investee opportunism arises. So does a
clear-cut opening for good-faith intervention in respect of the investee's manipulative conduct. The investee, an enterprise that had lost
its viability, intervened with Nasdaq to prevent delisting, where derights and swift liquidation
listing would have triggered redemption
68
for the venture capitalist's benefit.

65.
66.
67.
68.

Bratton, supra note 43, at 944.
705 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1997).
Id. at 1050-52.
Id. at 1047, 1051-52.
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In Benchmark, serious money was on offer in the new financing,
indicating a potentially viable investee. 69 The facts, as stated in the
opinion, imply opportunism and intransigence all around. Significantly, Benchmark's litigation objectives were not spelled out. It either sought to push the investee to liquidation, or it simply wanted a
larger proportionate share of the going concern. Either way, it presented a holdout threat. Meanwhile, if the ex post fairness issue were
joined, the judge would be left in indeterminate territory. When a
start-up remains viable but shaky, needs successive rounds of financing, and financing remains available, what is a fair, continuing percentage participation for early-stage equity that has decided to make
no further contributions? There is no easy answer.
Nor is it as if Benchmark was without alternatives. Because the
merger altered its rights under the charter, it could have dissented and
perfected its appraisal rights. 70 Opting for appraisal would have given
Benchmark the chance to make a mathematical showing of the
amount it thought represented its due under the original charter. Apparently Benchmark did not deem the probable returns on that exercise to be worth costs of the proof. Why should a court jump through
the hoops under the good-faith rubric so as to accord Benchmark, a
plaintiff of means, a right to hold up the new financing, a right that it
might have reserved at the original negotiating table?
At this point, a telling comparison can be made between Benchmark as a plaintiff in a rights-stripping case and a plaintiff class of
traditional, publicly traded preferred. Venture capital is relational and
all that, but the public holders may have the stronger case for equitable intervention. Unlike Benchmark, the public holders never get a
shot at negotiating the terms, and there might just be a couple Momand-Pop investors among the victims.

69. Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. Civ. A. 19719, 2002 WL
1732423 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2002), at *4-5.
70. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit 8, §§ 251(f), 262(b)(1) (2001).

